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ABSTRACT

The phenomenon of the welfare state and all the different formats in which it exists today
has been studied for decades now. One of the subfields currently studied with intensity is
the connection between the welfare states of Europe and the Christian democratic parties
that we find in these countries. However, this current research remains excessively
focused on cross-national comparisons rather than on in-depth analyses of specific
contexts. Furthermore, this subfield has not yet been revisited under the new assumption
that the politics driving the retrenchment of welfare benefits are fundamentally different
to the better understood expansion of welfare states. Motivated by these shortcomings,
this essay aims to elucidate the connection between Christian democracy and the welfare
state in the age of retrenchment by focusing on one national context (Germany), in which
we find two Christian democratic parties (CDU and CSU) that are engaged in a serious
conflict on social policy.

The essay claims that this conflict is not a party disagreement but a much deeper debate:
a re-alignment of Christian democratic social policy in the age of welfare retrenchment.
One side of the Christian democrats in both parties argues for market-oriented reforms,
while the other side argues for the safe-guarding of Christian social values. Current
developments indicate that the advocates for social values have gained the upper hand.
The reformers seem to have understood the new politics of welfare retrenchment: reforms
do not get elected. The conclusions of this essay hold that Christian democratic social
policy will not undergo a paradigmatic shift away from social values; that the German
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welfare state will survive; that the social policy of all parties will gravitate to the middle;
and that fundamental reform of the German welfare state is therefore very unlikely in the
near future.
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INTRODUCTION1
The connection between Christian democracy and welfare state politics has been a topic
of contention for a couple of decades now. Nonetheless, the issue remains largely obscure
and unresolved. What exactly is the Christian notion of social welfare? Is this notion
fundamentally different to other notions of the welfare state, for example the social
democratic notion? How do Christian democratic parties aim at institutionalizing their
ideal type of the welfare state?

These basic questions where addressed in the mid-nineties, first and foremost by the
leading scholar of Christian democratic welfare politics, Kees van Kersbergen. In search
for a definition of the Christian democratic welfare state, he embarked on a historical and
comparative study of multiple European welfare states that have been shaped
substantially by Christian democratic parties.2 His accomplishment lies in the fact that he
was the strongest voice in the struggle to overcome the commonly held notion that
Christian democratic welfare policy was merely a response to Social democratic welfare
policy, instead of being driven inherently and independently.3 Having demonstrated the
existence of a Christian democratic notion of the welfare state, van Kersbergen and other
leading scholars4 agreed that a clear definition of this Christian democratic notion was

1

As most of the primary research data underlying this essay exists only in German, many of the quotations
are my attempts at accurate translations
2
Kees van Kersbergen. Social Capitalism: A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state.
Routledge. London and New York, 1995
3
See Therborn (1994:106) as mentioned by van Kersbergen, page 5
4
For example David Hanley. Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective. Pinter
Publishers. London and New York, 1994
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nonetheless difficult to obtain.5 The exact link between Christian democracy and the
welfare state was and remains ambiguous.

The preliminary conclusion of this first wave of research is that Christian democratic
welfare policy is indeed to be understood specifically, yet that there are “a considerable
amount of cross-national variations in the character, complexion and political impacts of
the movements”.6 Van Kersbergen insisted, however, on the existence of a certain
nucleus of Christian democratic welfare policy that exists over time and national
differences.

The literature about the Christian democratic notion of the welfare state has two
shortcomings that motivate this essay. Firstly, the lion’s share of comparative research is
conducted across state boundaries, and therefore remains on a macro-level that cannot
provide much new insight – neither on the question of why the cross-national differences
that van Kersbergen identified exist, nor about the aims of political parties in specific
welfare regimes.7 As van Kersbergen noted in 1995, the quantitative cross-national
research approach was more suited to test first hypotheses and generate large
explanations.8 It seems, however, that cross-national comparative studies have largely
exhausted their explanatory power. The more the European political systems matured in
their individual ways after World War II, the more complex cross-national comparisons

5

Kees van Kersbergen. Social Capitalism: A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state, page 27
ibid. Page 29
7
Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, Silke van Dyk, and Martin Roggenkamp. What do Parties Want? An Analysis of
Programmatic Social Policy Aims in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. ZeS –Arbeitspapier Nr.
1/2005. Zentrum für Sozialpolitik. Universität Bremen, 2005. Page 5
8
Kees van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state, page 8
6
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have become. Most differences at deeper levels between the welfare policy of the
Christian democratic parties of Germany and Holland, for example, have to be attributed
to differences between the political settings of Germany and the Netherlands. It is thus
not surprising that quantitative cross-national comparisons by van Kersbergen, Hanley
and others have not been able to identify much more than a certain “nucleus” of Christian
democratic welfare policy. At this point, it seems opportune to take the opposite approach:
to search for larger lessons about Christian democracy and the welfare state by engaging
in comparative historical analysis of one specific country.

The second shortcoming of existing literature on Christian democracy and the welfare
state concerns its objective. The question underlying most research has been the role of
Christian democratic social doctrine on the development of the modern welfare state. The
most recent wave of welfare state research, however, has been concerned not with the
development, but with the retrenchment of welfare states. This shift in welfare studies
has barely reached the subfield of Christian democracy and the welfare state. More
discussion in this area is needed. The scope of this paper is thus limited to one country,
Germany, in an attempt to gain deeper insights into Christian democracy and the welfare
state in times of retrenchment.

The early experts of Christian democratic welfare politics found both motivation and
frustration in the lack of scholarly material about the connection between Christian
democracy and the welfare state.9 This call to arms has been followed by many, German

9

Kees van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state, page 27
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academics included.10 Nonetheless, one particularly interesting area of study has, to my
knowledge, not been touched upon by a single article yet: the case of two major Christian
democratic parties in one country: Germany. Studying the German case is particularly
interesting because it promises access to results that could remedy both of the
shortcomings of existing literature mentioned above.

Concerning the need for more research on national contexts instead of cross-national
differences, Germany is a promising target for more research. Its political landscape is
shaped by two separate Christian democratic parties: the Christlich Demokratische Union
(CDU) and the Christlich Soziale Union (CSU). While, as we shall see, the CDU and the
CSU are far from equivalent, and while they operate in very different political settings,
they nonetheless exist in one and the same national political framework. A comparison of
the social policies of these two Christian democratic parties therefore has the advantage
that all variables of cross-national difference can be ignored. A comparative study of the
social policy of CDU and CSU thus exposes a whole new set of variables on a more
profound level than quantitative comparisons of different welfare states could discover.
An analysis of the German case and its two Christian democratic parties will therefore
allow for a substantial assessment of current theory about the causal connection between
Christian democracy and the welfare state.

The German case is just as promising to remedy the second shortcoming – the limited
insights that we have into Christian democratic welfare policy in the age of welfare
10

The most notable research groupings in Germany include the so-called Göttingen school around Bochert
and Lessenich, and the Bremen school around Neyer and Seeleib-Kaiser of the Zentrum für Sozialpolitik of
the Universität Bremen.
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retrenchment. If there are new developments or paradigmatic shifts to be observed at the
nexus between Christian democracy and the welfare state in the age of retrenchment, then
these shifts and changes should be most visible in a country that has more than one
Christian democratic party. Debates between two parties tend to take place in the public
sphere more so than one party’s internal debates do. As a result, press coverage about the
contended issues is more extensive. Primary research should thus be most accessible and
fruitful in this environment of two separate Christian democratic parties.

The time for this study seems ripe. A large-scale debate about social policy has been
developing in Germany over the last few years. More so than ever, the social values of
Christian democracy are being debated; and their applicability to practical Christian
democratic policy is being discussed. The CDU and the CSU – always quarreling over
one issue or another – have moved their debate to the area of social policy for the first
time in their history. If the CDU and the CSU do indeed have different notions of the
Christian democratic welfare state, then these differences should be most observable
under current circumstances.

This essay argues, however, that these recent disputes between the CDU and the CSU
over issues of social policy are not to be interpreted as proof of a programmatic
difference between the two party’s convictions on welfare, but rather as an expression of
a wider debate on the social notion of Christian democracy in the 21st century. The
different sides of the debate can be found in both the CDU and the CSU. However, the
CSU decided early to take a stance that defends the social values of Christian democracy

9

staunchly, if only for electoral reasons. The CDU took a more reform-oriented stance. In
short: the party dispute is a result of the greater debate in the Christian democratic camp,
not its cause.

In order to validate this thesis as well as to be able to draw valuable conclusions from it,
this essay will progress by asking the following questions: What is the nature of both the
party dispute and the general debate in the Christian democratic camp? Why is the
Christian democratic camp of Germany not united on social policy in the age of
retrenchment? How can the disagreement be explained? What do these explanations tell
us about the nexus between Christian democracy and the welfare state in the age of
retrenchment?

I. THE DISAGREEMENT ON SOCIAL POLICY IN THE CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATIC CAMP
“The CSU is the only real people’s party in Germany”11, proclaimed Edmund Stoiber,
chairman of the CSU, in March of this year. Students of political science at the
University of Trier are told: “The CSU is more conservative and at the same time more
social than the CDU.”12 An editorial in the Süddeutsche Zeitung claims: “The CSU still
takes catholic social doctrine seriously. Angela Merkel (CDU) seems to deem it part of

11

Excerpt from Edmund Stoiber’s speech in Passau on March 1st 2006: http://www.csu.de/csuportal/csude/uploadedfiles/Reden/060301_Aschermittwoch.pdf
12
Excerpt from Prof. Dr. Adolf Kimmel, The political system of the Federal Republic of Germany. WinterSemester 2002/2003. Universität Trier. www.politik.uni-trier.de/mitarbeiter/kimmel/ws0203/vl_union.pdf
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the communist platform!”13 These and countless other examples indicate how deeply
entrenched the opinion is that the CSU is “more social” than the CDU. Hence, both
intuition and superficial judgment suggest that the debate about social policy in the
Christian democratic camp runs along the party divide.

Indeed, the debate on social issues between CDU and CSU has a constant presence in the
popular press of Germany in recent years. A country where the current number of
unemployed gets mentioned and discussed in almost every news broadcast or newspaper,
issues of welfare reform and social policy are omni-present. Not only does the Christian
democratic Union of CDU and CSU take up debate with the social democrats. The Union
itself is constantly quarreling about its common party line in social affairs. The CDU and
CSU seem to forget every day that they have pledged to stand united and to discuss their
differences internally before stepping into the public realm.

This dispute about welfare policy between the CDU and the CSU has reached a level of
intensity that was never attained before. While the two Christian democratic parties have
always quarreled, they were usually quite united on social policy. The fact that social
policy has become such a “hot topic” all of a sudden seems to suggest that one of two
variables has changed: the relationship between the two parties, or the nature of welfare
politics. Let us examine the first possible factor: the relationship between the CDU and
the CSU.

13

Excerpt from Heribert Prantl’s editorial Der Ruck durch Deutschland ist ein Riss. Süddeutsche Zeitung
of October 8th 2003. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/222/19203/
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A. Disputes about social policy between the CDU and the CSU

It can safely be assumed that the chairman of the CDU is more nervous when holding a
speech in front of a congregation of the CSU than when she is speaking to a conference
hall full of union leaders. Visits to Bavaria are rare for leaders of the CDU. In 2005, the
CSU held its 60th anniversary and invited Angela Merkel to speak at the celebration. She
agreed, and she spoke in her usual candor: “We know that we cannot manage without
each other, even though things aren’t always easy between us.”14 It is not a coincidence
that these words remind us of what an elder sister says to her small brother in times of
brotherly peace – the relationship between the CDU and the CSU has often been
characterized as such. In order to understand the dynamics that underlie the relationship
of, and all disputes between, the CDU and the CSU, a grasp of the political landscape
surrounding the two Christian democratic parties must first be established.

1.

The set-up of the Christian democratic camp in Germany

Germany’s political landscape has produced a unique situation: the Christlich
Demokratische Union (CDU) established itself as the leading party after World War II,
and remains one of the two Volksparteien (people’s parties) that run nation-wide,
alongside the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD). The CDU thus closely
mirrors the nature of Christian democratic parties in neighboring countries such as the
Netherlands, were it not for two differences: firstly, the CDU is decidedly inter14

Die Welt newspaper, CSU feiert 60. Geburtstag. December 3rd 2005
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confessional.15 Having been founded with quite a direct tie to Christian theology, the
CDU was fundamentally changed by its first chancellor. Konrad Adenauer, himself a
practicing catholic, insisted on the separation of politics and religion. In fact, the CDU
does not require belief in the Christian God. It only lays claim to the general values of the
Christian tradition, while remaining open to non-Christians. This rather liberal religious
outlook is quite unique amongst the Christian democratic parties of Europe.

The second abnormality of the CDU can be found in the fact that there is no CDU in one
of Germany’s Länder: in Bavaria. The large southernmost Land is the only part of
Germany in which the CDU is not represented. At its place one finds the Christlich
Soziale Union (CSU). The CDU and the CSU are similar politically and have formed a
continuous alliance on the organizational level since the first Bundestag met in 1949. The
CSU is, however, an autonomous political party with its own chairman, headquarters,
membership, congresses and organizational history.16 The alliance on the federal level –
usually referred to as the CDU/CSU or simply as the Union – binds both parties to the
agreement never to compete for each other’s membership, not to run against each other in
elections, to always form a common Fraktion in the Bundestag, and to propose a
common candidate for chancellorship before elections of the Bundestag.

With such a high level of collaboration, the formal division between the two parties
seems like a benign and simple formality. However, the institutional implications of this
15

Ulrich Lappenküper. Between Concentration Movement and People’s Party: The Christian Democratic
Union in Germany. In Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945,
Vol. 2. Routledge. London and New York, 2004. Page 26
16 Geoffrey Pridham. Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and
Opposition, 1945-1976. St. Martin’s Press. New York, 1977. Page 303
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division have been defining for the political history of modern Germany. Remaining
barely noticeable when all is smooth, the friction between the CDU and the CSU has
emerged and almost erupted more than once during politically charged times, and it
continues to be an issue today. The reason for this constant but contained friction is that
real differences between Bavaria and the rest of Germany underlie the division between
the CDU and the CSU.

To the foreign observer, Germany seems like a very homogenous country, which is
undoubtedly reinforced by Germany’s centralized past of totalitarianism between 1933
and 1945. If one looks at a map of Europe from anywhere between the 16th to the 19th
century, one finds France, Spain, Britain and Russia as one expects. In Germany’s place,
however, one finds a patchwork of small city-states and counties that existed as
independent states and monarchies for centuries. Only in 1871 was political unity
achieved in Germany, and this “unification” through the Prussians under Bismarck was
far from voluntary. Local differences and resentments are just as defining for Germany’s
culture as they are for its political system – and they remain important to this day. Among
all regions of Germany, Bavaria is known to unite the strongest local patriotism, antiPrussian resentment, and separatist tendency, all of which cause a rather dismissive
reaction towards Bavaria in the rest of Germany. Nothing illustrates this fact as well as
the electoral failures of the CDU/CSU when they chose the leader of the CSU as their
common candidate for chancellorship17. The cleavage between Bavaria and the rest of
Germany is real.

17

On Strauß in 1980: David Broughton, The CDU-CSU in Germany: Is There Any Alternative? In: David
Hanley, Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective. Pinter Publishers. London and New
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In this socio-political background, it is not surprising that the CSU never joined the
national CDU. When a myriad of Christian political groups appeared out of the ashes of
World War II in all of Germany, it quickly became apparent that they were concerned not
to end up divided and weak as the Christian parties had been during the Weimar Republic.
The national CDU and the Bavarian CSU had emerged by the end of 1945.18 Largely due
to historical reasons and general opinion favoring an independent Bavaria, the CSU faced
strong political pressure from the almost separatist Bayernpartei. The CSU therefore
decided not to merge with the national CDU. It remained as the only local Christian
democratic party not to have joined the CDU19.

From these early days on, both the CDU and the CSU repeatedly stressed how close the
two parties were in ideology and political purpose. During the first CDU/CSU party
congress of Goslar in 1950, Karl Sigmund Mayr of the CSU stated clearly that CDU and
CSU “have the same principles and purposes.”20 Addressing his fellow CDU delegates,
Chancellor Adenauer agreed: “You all know that there is no difference between the
Christlich Soziale Union and us, if only occasionally in expression and temperament.”21
Chancellor Adenauer foresaw exactly what was to define the relationship between CDU
and CSU over the next decades: not programmatic differences, but temperament of party
leaders and power politics.
York, 1994. Page 111. On Stoiber in 2002: Mike Linstead, Stoiber: Good, but not good enough. BBC News.
Http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2276452.stm
18
Ernst Deuerlein. CDU/CSU 1945-1957: Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte. Verlag J. P. Bachem. Köln, 1957.
Page 70
19
ibid. Page 182
20
ibid. Page 178
21
ibid. Page 156
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The only serious example of programmatic differences between the two parties in the
early days was one clash during the passing of the Grundgesetz, the basic law of
Germany, which many CSU delegates opposed because they wanted Bavaria to be even
more independent in the federacy.22 Apart from this fall-out, collaboration was close.
Since 1947, the CDU and the CSU had formed the Arbeitsgemeinschaft CDU/CSU,23
which can be seen as the rudimentary form of the later CDU/CSU Fraktion. Work of the
Arbeitsgruppe largely guaranteed programmatic accord.24 Part of this working group was
the Sozialausschuss, a social committee made up of CDU and CSU social policy experts,
in which agreement seems to have been clear and constant.25 In short, during their time of
establishment, the CDU and the CSU had negligible programmatic differences at best.

The general relationship between CDU and CSU from the 1950s to this day can be
summed up in a simple paradigm. The nature of their political co-operation is one of
mutual dependence. The CDU needs the electoral support of the CSU to form a
parliamentary coalition in the Bundestag. The CSU seeks to influence national politics
through its alliance with the CDU.26 Hence, the stronger the CDU is politically, the less it
needs the CSU. Policy differences have always been adapted to fit the level of political
co-operation of the day, erupting when the CSU feels strong, and being toned down in

22

Ernst Deuerlein. CDU/CSU 1945-1957: Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte. Pages 182-183
English translation: “Working Group CDU/CSU”
24
Ernst Deuerlein. CDU/CSU 1945-1957: Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte. Page 76
25
ibid. Page 83
26
Geoffrey Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and
Opposition, 1945-1976, page 303
23
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times of great political strength of the CDU. The dominant variable in the relationship
between CDU and CSU is thus political agreement, not policy agreement.

In practice, the three decades from 1950 to 1980 each illustrate a different level of
political co-operation. During the 1950s, when Chancellor Adenauer was the unrivaled
icon of Germany’s economic recovery after the war, political harmony between CDU and
CSU was at its highest. Franz-Josef Strauß, the leading CSU politician of the 20th century,
commented in 1955: “We depend naturally […] on the success of the Bonn government.
If we had a weaker Chancellor than Adenauer, we could without further ado exert a more
powerful trial of strength.”27

The fading strength of Adenauer in the 1960s and the emergence of Strauß as an
exceptionally ambitious leader of the CSU made for a qualitative change in the
relationship between CDU and CSU, exacerbated in the 1970s by the fact that the
CDU/CSU found itself in opposition for the first time.28 The CSU turned its autonomous
position into an independent one, taking increasingly separate policy stances. The
common conception that the CSU is more conservative and right-of-centre than the CDU
dates back to these policy disagreements, especially to such forceful debates as those
about the Berlin crisis of the early 1960s or the Warsaw Treaties of 1972, in which the
CSU repeatedly took the more conservative stance.29 However, it needs to be clearly
noted here that social policy was never at the forefront of the debate between CDU and

27

Geoffrey Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and
Opposition, 1945-1976, page 307
28
ibid. Page 308
29
ibid. Page 312
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CSU in those decades; disagreements lay exclusively in foreign, European and German
policy.

In conclusion, the relationship between the CDU and the CSU is largely defined by
power politics rather than policy. More concretely, policy disagreement only erupts in
times of weak electoral performance of the CDU nationally in combination with strong
electoral performance of the CSU in Bavaria. Fuelling this dynamic, the personal
dimension is considerable as well.30 Friction between the two parties erupted into open
conflict only when a strong CSU politician found no match on the side of the CDU.31

Having established the secondary nature of policy agreement in the relationship of the
CDU and the CSU, it is now possible to identify the differences on social policy between
the two parties. An historical perspective is more appropriate here than a simple synthesis.

2.

Historical perspective on the social policy of CDU and CSU

The “S” in CSU strikes the eye. Whereas the CDU stands for “Christian Democratic
Union”, the CSU boasts “Christian Social Union”. Is the CSU the more social party of
the two? The simple answer is no. The difference in party names can be explained
differently. In 1945, when a myriad of Christian democratic parties emerged all over
Germany, almost all of them called themselves either Christian democratic or Christian
30

Geoffrey Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and
Opposition, 1945-1976, page 315
31
ibid. Page 312
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social. Josef Müller, a leader of the CSU at the time, explained in 1955 that many of the
party leaders opting for the “social” deemed it inappropriate for a party to call itself
democratic when it was not the party that can be thanked for Germany’s return to
democracy, but instead the liberation by external powers. When the CSU decided to
remain autonomous, it obviously kept its name to differentiate itself from the name of the
national CDU as well. The difference in party names – this simplest of all arguments –
thus cannot prove the CSU to be more social.

A comparison of their respective party programs might give an answer. This endeavor,
however, would provide more reliable conclusions about the literary quality of the
respective authors than about the differences in their views on social policy. The times
when programs still fundamentally varied and when they offered a concise perspective on
the differences between political parties are long gone. Franz Walter, one of Germany’s
leading political scientists and experts on Germany’s political parties, describes the
modern reality of party programs as follows:

Nobody is interested in political programs, nobody reads them; nobody
knows them, nobody needs them. Lofty programmatic ideals come in
handy when celebrating the historic days of the nation in the conference
halls of protestant academies. In day-to-day politics, it is more important
to make sure that the workings of hardcore power politics are not
disturbed by quixotic dogmatists.32

32

Franz Walter, Auf der Suche nach der Seele der Partei. Spiegel Online, April 24th 2006
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Instead of looking for programmatic differences, one has to follow the path of social
policy historically in order to get an understanding of the differences in social policy
between the CDU and the CSU. As has been noted above, disagreements about social
policy were not at the forefront of debate until the 1990s. Instead, the CDU and the CSU
developed their social policy in a very parallel manner.

The 1950s were the defining period in the formation of Christian democratic social policy
in Germany. Van Kersbergen’s case study of Germany33 includes a comprehensive
summary of this time. He notes correctly that all political actors in immediate post-war
Germany agreed that the state should have an active role to alleviate the dramatically
desolate socio-economic situation that Germany faced after the war. When explaining
why Germany adopted so many old welfare institutions from the Weimar and National
Socialist period, van Kersbergen rightfully criticizes Jens Alber’s explanation – which
claims mainly institutional inertia to have been the cause – by pointing out that, had the
social democrats won the first election of the Bundestag in 1949, a comprehensive
overhaul of all social systems could have ensued – a long-term goal of the Allies, it
should be noted.34 Van Kersbergen ascribes the decision by the first CDU/CSU
government to adopt many old institutions entirely to the fact that the old system suited
the Christian democratic view of social policy to a large extent.35 Obviously, this
conclusion suits the thesis of his book, in which he is attempting to prove that a
specifically Christian democratic social policy does indeed exist. That might explain why

33

Van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state, pages 111124
34
ibid. Pages 111, 113-114
35
ibid. Page 114
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van Kersbergen passes over another strong explanation for why the CDU/CSU
government chose to re-institute the old welfare system, namely that the chaotic
circumstances in Germany at the time called for fast solutions to the problem of missing
welfare institutions.36 Important to note is, however, that van Kersbergen agrees with
other scholars in that he does not mention a single deviation in social policy between
CDU and CSU in this early period. Christian democratic social policy was very coherent
from the beginning on.

The expansion of the German welfare state peaked in the early 1970s. First alarmed by
the economic recession triggered by the oil crisis, German fiscal politicians started to
realize the effects that future economic downturns would have on the German welfare
system. The demographic factor was discussed in an alarming tone, and economic
globalization had started to expose the issue of high labor costs due to employer
contributions for social benefits and its effect on Germany’s competitiveness in a global
economy. These realizations were exacerbated by the fact that the social democrats, in
power for the first time, were still extending the welfare state, substantially worsening the
German deficit.

In those days at the end of welfare state expansion, the CDU/CSU began to develop what
is referred to by some as the “dual transformation of the German welfare state”:37 on the
one side retrenchment of general programs and decreasing emphasis on the guarantee of
the achieved living standard of workers, and on the other side an expansion of welfare
36
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benefits for families and the “truly needy”.38 The Christian democrats distanced
themselves more and more from the ambition of full employment, and started to prioritize
on balancing state finances and unleashing market forces for renewed economic growth.
Following the motto “more market mechanisms in the labor market”,39 the Christian
democrats advanced together, even against strong outcries from the opposition and the
general public.40 The Union stood united on social policy.

Seven years after the CDU/CSU had re-gained power in Bonn, the Berlin Wall came
down, and Germany erupted in joy at the pending unification. Emotions were high, and
Kohl’s position was uncompromising. This was the great moment of his chancellorship,
as well as the goal of decades of Christian democratic Deutschlandpolitik – a policy field
that had to do with nothing but the question of how to bring about unification. The result
of this exaltation was a forging together of two dichotomously different economic and
social communities.

Of course there were debates about the best strategy to unite these unlike parts, but the
Christian democrats were surprisingly united around the strategy that the quickest way to
obtain equality between the old and new Länder was to treat them alike. Much under
value, East German funds were transformed 1:1 into the Deutsche Mark, the strongest
currency of Europe at the time. The generous welfare systems of Western Germany were
transferred to the new Länder. More precisely, one state of already worrying finances
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embraced a nation that could not compete in economic terms and whose people had been
told for more than one whole generation that responsibility for all decision-making and
for all welfare lay in the state. All at once, an enormous part of the working population in
the former GDR became unemployed with the collapse of the state-run economy, and the
exodus of the young and bright was unstoppable. If one wants to put it even more starkly:
in a few years after unification, Germany’s welfare state had exploded, while government
revenues had grown by little. Welfare expenditures in the new Länder reached two thirds
of their GDP, and an all-time high of 34.9% emerged in all of Germany by 1996.41

The conclusion to take away here is that the Christian democratic ambitions to
consolidate state finances and reform the welfare state to adapt it to times of slower
economic and demographic growth were intersected by the long-awaited unification of
Germany. For many years, the economic and political situation of Germany was so
dominated by the effects of unification that one could not talk of a status quo to be
analyzed, understood, and reformed. Only at the end of the century did the reality of the
German welfare state become clear. Many ascribe the malaise of the German welfare
state to the fact that the chance for a major overhaul of welfare systems was not seized at
the time of unification. Amongst these critics were such high ranking CDU politicians as
Kurt Biedenkopf and Wolfgang Schäuble.42 According to them, the already inefficient
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welfare systems of West Germany should have been reformed before being exported to
the new Länder.

Regardless of the validity of this interpretation, what remains undisputed is that
unification brought uncertainty and chaos at a time when meticulous analysis and reform
of the existing systems would have been needed. Instead, Germany was battling issues of
such magnitude that serious debate about reforming the welfare systems was only
possible at the end of the 1990s. Budget consolidation had been the Christian democrats’
main priority since the 1980s, and in the latter years of his chancellorship, Kohl finally
achieved some results.43 In 1997, Kohl’s government passed a major pension reform,
which inserted a demographic factor into the pension formula – the first paradigmatic
reform of the German pension system as it undermined the ideological footing that
achieved living standards are to be guaranteed absolutely.44 One year later, Kohl was
dethroned after 16 years in power. The social democrats under Gerhard Schröder had
promised during the election campaign to abolish the demographical factor should they
get elected – a campaign move that proved to be quite decisive, as exit polls show45 – and
so they swiftly retracted Kohl’s pension reform after they won the election.46 Only
shortly after he had reversed the pension law, Chancellor Schröder realized the
seriousness of the financing problems of current welfare state systems, and began to plan
his own wave of reforms.
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3.

Recent disputes about social policy between the CDU and the
CSU

Between the lost election of 1998 and the year 2000, a substantial party financing scandal
had disturbed the CDU. Many leading politicians of Kohl’s old guard gave up their
leadership in a very short period of time. New leaders of the CDU emerged, amongst
them Angela Merkel, now Chancellor of Germany, and Friedrich Merz, a young lawyer
and finance expert who rose quickly in the ranks of the CDU. The dynamic between
Merkel and Merz swiftly developed into a struggle for leadership, which was finally
decided when Merz resigned all of his party functions in 2004. He is now active in a wide
array of private functions; amongst them the supervisory board of the Deutsche Börse,
the German stock exchange.

On the side of the CDU, Merkel and Merz are the protagonists of what was to turn into
the most difficult period of political collaboration between the CDU and the CSU. Until
2002, the power dynamics were still largely undecided, since the CDU had lost so much
of its leadership in the financing scandal. By 2002, when the CDU and the CSU decided
on Edmund Stoiber as their common candidate for chancellorship,47 they stood largely
divided, and then lost the election of the Bundestag. Many things changed during the
second legislative period of social democratic government, however. The period between
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2002 and 2004 became the climax of dispute over social policy between CDU and CSU
to date.

In 2003, Schröder’s government established a commission to investigate the social
security system and to model the effects of possible reforms. Angela Merkel followed by
establishing a commission for the CDU, with largely identical objectives. This
commission, the Herzog Commission, produced a report that was to become the
backbone of CDU social policy for the next years.

The year 2003 was a year of great hope. People and politicians were motivated to reform
the German welfare system for the first time. The seriousness of the situation had become
largely accepted, and politicians of almost all parties where arguing for the need for
reform. Before the Herzog Commission published its report, Edmund Stoiber and the
CSU were calling for the most radical reforms, while Merkel and the CDU were trying to
keep all wings of the party together by demanding moderation in the speed and extend of
reform.

After the publication of the Herzog-Paper – as the product of the Herzog Commission
came to be called – the roles changed. Merkel, her leadership of the Union largely
fermented by her initiative to start the commission, adopted a radical approach to reforms
of welfare systems. The extremely reform-oriented Friedrich Merz was at the height of
his influence on CDU policy.
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The CSU did not follow this policy transition. Initially represented in the Herzog
Commission by its long-standing social policy expert Horst Seehofer, the CSU left the
commission because of fundamental disagreements about the direction into which the
findings were leading: the direction of welfare retrenchment. The CSU lamented that the
Herzog-Paper represented a directional decision that questioned the very pillars of a
Volkspartei, a people’s party.48

The dispute between CDU and CSU became quite substantial. The Herzog-Paper exposed
a deep cleavage between the CDU and the CSU. All of the four major parts of the
German welfare system (pension insurance, unemployment insurance, health insurance,
and long-term care insurance)49 were included in the scope of the commission. Largely
based on a model of future demographic developments, it called for substantial reforms in
all areas. Amongst them was the detachment of non-wage labor costs from healthcare
expenditure, capital cover for the pension insurance system and an incremental increase
of the retirement age.

The press coverage of early 2004 communicates a clear picture of dispute: the CDU and
CSU disagree on most major policies: retirement, health, fiscal, and employment.50 The
leaders of CDU and CSU make a point of disagreeing with the each other: when Merz
proposes something, Stoiber disagrees, and vice versa.51 Seehofer claims that the CSU is
the party for the common people, and that he is trying to get the CDU on the social track
48
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of the CSU.52 Merz rebuts by alleging that the CSU is hypocritical on social policy
because it presses forward reforms in Bavaria, while resisting the larger nationwide
reforms.53

The dispute was carried out over many questions of social policy, but one issue stands out
and will be mentioned in greater detail here: the dispute over the financing system of
Germany’s mandatory health insurance. Reinforced by the Herzog-Paper, the CDU and
the CSU began reviving their old differences about a reform of the insurance financing.
The two positions can be summarized as follows.

The CDU was arguing that the financing reform should focus on re-organizing the system
by which the levels of individual health insurance contributions are determined. The
current progressive rate, linked to the income level of the insured subject, was to be
replaced by a flat rate to be contributed by each person. The needy and children would
then be aided through a fund that was to be financed out of general government revenues.
The CSU claimed that this flat rate was unsocial. According to them, such a system
would favor the rich and increase strain on the needy.54 Most CSU experts wanted the
income transfer to take place inside of the health insurance system – through higher rates
for people with higher incomes – not from without the system – through general revenues.
The CSU thus proposed a mandatory health insurance similar to the system already in
place, with the difference that all sources of incomes (including profits, rent, and interest)
would factor into the contribution rate, and that all workers (including public officials,
52
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the self-employed and the privately insured) would have to participate.55 This type of
system, however, was in turn rejected by the CDU, most probably because of the
traditionally close ties that the CDU entertains with the pharmaceutical companies, as
well as with the associations of doctors and pharmacists.56

A dispute of such technical nature had major consequences. In April, Friedrich Merz had
publicly mentioned the possibility that he CDU could leave the CDU/CSU Fraktion if the
CSU continued to oppose CDU social policy.57 When Angela Merkel began to give in to
the CSU on some points, internal debate became so staunch that Friedrich Merz dropped
his party positions in the CDU. The staunchest opponent of CSU social policy had thus
given up, and a compromise was duly reached in November.58 With the departure of
Friedrich Merz, however, the CDU had undergone an important change in both
leadership and program.

Until the elections of 2005, both Merkel and Stoiber were interested in bettering the
relations between CDU and CSU in order to run a unified election campaign to finally
regain power in Berlin for the first time again since 1998. This approach was not entirely
successful, however. Both continued to defect on each other. Relations remained strained.
The reciprocal alienation between CDU and CSU has been blamed by many to have
negatively influenced the election campaign, and therefore the disappointing election
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results of both CDU and CSU. Nonetheless, the votes sufficed for a grand coalition with
the social democrats, and so the Christian democrats are back in power after all. Social
policy remains the most frequently disputed policy field, however. While the debate
between Merz and Seehofer seems to have represented a peak in social policy
disagreement between CDU and CSU, it was by no means a singular occurrence. These
very days, another major disagreement is brewing: the Elterngeld (“parents money”),
proposed by Ursula von der Leyen – CDU minister of family, senior citizens, women and
youth – is largely contested by the CSU. The dispute between CDU and CSU seems to be
a true dividing line in the debate about modern Christian democratic social policy.

B. Disputes about social policy across the party divide

Even though the policy clashes between the CDU and the CSU are real, it would be
wrong to causally explain the debate about social policy in the Christian democratic camp
by referring to the differences between CDU and CSU. There is much evidence that
points to the existence of an even larger debate in the Christian democratic camp: not
between CDU and CSU, but between two fractions in both parties that want to push
Christian democracy into different directions. This evidence for a larger debate has to be
visited before the nature of the debate in the Christian democratic camp can be
conclusively defined.
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It is indeed an oversimplification to call the CSU “more social” than the CDU. Firstly,
the general gist on social policy reform changes periodically in both parties. After the lost
election of 2002, we find Stoiber and the CSU as the main callers for radical reform.
Merkel and the CDU argued for moderation and the importance of social values.59

After the publication of the Herzog reform, Merkel and Merz carry the CDU to unheardoff levels of reform politics, while Stoiber and the CSU adopt the “social” side of the
debate. At the CDU convention of 2003, Merkel’s radical reform propositions are
celebrated with great applause. One year later, at the convention of 2004, her reformist
spirit is gone, and she undoubtedly would have received even less applause than she
already did, had she spoken about the need for reforms again.60 During the election
campaign another year later, Merkel’s new general secretary, Volker Kauder, even
promises that the Christian democrats would not cut welfare benefits if they were to be
elected. The CSU’s Michael Glos insists that welfare reform must by necessity cause
welfare cuts.61 The assignment of the “social” role in the Christian democratic camp
therefore seems to be inexplicable if one seeks it at the party cleavage. The reasons for
the debate about social policy in the Christian democratic camp must lie deeper than at
the party level.

All evidence suggests that Christian democrats, as well as all other political camps, have
never encountered a wider array of opinions on social policy in their own ranks than
59
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today. In these times of welfare retrenchment, old boundaries between policies, and
therefore between parties, seem to have dissolved somewhat. The more market-oriented
wing of the social democrats, the “Seeheimer Kreis”, defends much more radical social
policy reform than the more socially oriented wing of the Christian Democrats. Another
example is the wide political agreement between the social policy experts of the CSU and
the SPD: Horst Seehofer and Ulla Schmidt.62 It is sometimes becoming hard to predict
which parties will favor which policy.63 An illustrative example of this surrounds the
proposed “parents’ money”: Initiated by the CDU minister Ursula von der Leyen, it is
largely contested by other Christian democrats in both CDU and CSU,64 but defended by
the Social democrats.65

The most observable party-internal disputes in recent years have occurred between the
same set of protagonists. In the CDU, the market-oriented wing centered around Friedrich
Merz before he left active politics, and is now led by prime ministers of some Länder:
most notably by Roland Koch of Hessia and Christian Wulff of Lower Saxony.66 On the
more socially-oriented side, one finds other prime ministers: Jürgen Rüttgers of NorthRhine Westphalia, as well as the CDU prime ministers in the new Länder, who are
careful with calls for radical reform because of the high levels of social dependence and
the limited economic perspectives of their constituencies.
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At the height of his power in the CDU, Friedrich Merz exaltedly announced the end of
the “socialist trend in the CDU” after his party had adopted the Herzog-Paper as the basis
of its social policy.67 One year later, the constant struggle against the social wing of the
CDU, as well as difficult relations with Merkel, had driven Merz into frustration and
resignation.

More recently, the two groupings clashed over an article that Roland Koch had written
for the Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung, arguably Germany’s most respected newspaper. In
the article, Koch had stressed the importance of the principle of freedom in the program
of the CDU. At the meeting of the CDU board of directors, Rüttgers replied that Koch’s
view of the nucleus of the CDU program differed from his. He saw not freedom, but
freedom and justice, as the nucleus of Christian democratic values. Rüttgers alleged that
the CDU had shifted its three pillars – Christian-social, conservative, liberal – too far in
the liberal direction. The conservative and Christian-social aspects had suffered in the
process.68

Christoph Schult und Ralf Neukirch, two leading journalists at Der Spiegel magazine,
claimed that Merkel was not altogether happy when Rüttgers won the race for prime
minister of North-Rhine Westphalia.69 His opposition to Merkel’s reform politics was
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well-known. It is indeed interesting to note that Merkel’s calls for reform have become
much more silent since Rüttgers’ star has risen.

The internal debate of the CDU on social policy has even caused old party leaders to
speak up again. At the height of Merkel’s and Merz’s vigor for reform, Norbert Blüm
alleged that Merkel was abandoning the German concept of the welfare state.70 When the
current party chairman is criticized so strongly by the former minister of employment and
social affairs who had led all welfare reforms between 1982 and 1998, the existence of an
internal debate on social affairs becomes quite undeniable.
The very same internal debate can be found in the CSU. The Christian socialists have
been led by two very different politicians over the last couple of years: Stoiber and
Seehofer. Chairman Stoiber had been largely influenced by his mentor Franz Josef
Strauß; his political style is defined by pragmatism, a respected grasp on finance and
economics, effective aid to businesses in Bavaria, as well as superb management of the
relations to all interest groups. The second in running, Horst Seehofer, is very different
indeed. Son of a truck driver and construction worker, Seehofer has close ties to the
population and interest groups of rural Bavaria. His policy expertise lies in health policy,
of which he was federal minister between 1992 and 1998. Seehofer has widely differing
political views than Stoiber in terms of social policy. Von Hammerstein, Knaup and
Pfister, three leading political journalists, define Seehofer as “the social conscience of the
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conservatives, the last prominent representative of catholic social doctrine, the man who
defended Blüm’s heritage.”71
Why would two politicians as different as Stoiber and Seehofer remain at the top of the
CSU in a stable balance of power for years and years? The explanation lies in the fact
that they are each supported by two different camps within the CSU: the market-oriented
and the socially-oriented camp.
In conclusion, the debate about social policy in the Christian democratic camp of
Germany is not defined by a dispute between the two Christian democratic parties, but by
a dispute between two fractions that are present in both the CDU and the CSU. The
externally visible cross-party disputes are thus not the origin but a result of the more
general ideological debate of Christian democracy in Germany. Having identified the
nature and extent of the debate, the next question can be approached: why is the Christian
democratic camp of Germany divided in the age of retrenchment?

II. EXPLAINING THE DISAGREEMENT ON SOCIAL POLICY AMONGST
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN THE AGE OF RETRENCHMENT
As has been noted above, social policy was never the major topic of dispute before the
1990s - neither between the CDU and the CSU, nor amongst the Christian democrats at
large. The temporal dimension must therefore play an important role in any approach to
explaining the debate. Why has the disagreement only emerged in this intensity now?
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What independent variables are causally related to the emergence of two separate
fractions of Christian democrats that widely disagree with each other on social policy?

Possible variables that are causally related to the debate can be structured into two groups:
the ideological and the practical. The ideological domain can be ruled out. Although
Christian social doctrine is often referenced in the debate, these references remain largely
rhetorical. The debates are too technical in nature to be related directly to differences in
Christian social doctrine. There are no traces of Rerum novarum and Quadragesimo anno,
the two papal encyclicals most directly related to social politics,72 in the two positions of
the current debate on social policy. If the two sides of the debate would separate along
the catholic-protestant cleavage in Germany, a case based on ideology could be made, but
it has already been established that this is not the case. Furthermore, if there was a
relation between the debate and catholic social doctrine, the socially-oriented fraction of
the CSU would be sure to stress this, as few of their voters are not catholic. However, this
is not the case either. The current debate is thus not causally related to Christian social
doctrine.

One variable is fundamentally different now than at the time when social policy was not
debated in the Christian democratic camp: the nature of welfare politics. Simply said:
when the welfare state was being expanded, the Christian democrats of Germany agreed
on welfare politics. Now that welfare retrenchment is the question of the day,
disagreement is more intense than in any other policy field. Explanations of the
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dependent variable (the invigoration of social policy debate amongst Christian democrats)
must therefore focus on the independent variables related to the change from welfare
expansion to welfare retrenchment.

A. The independent variables of welfare state retrenchment

1.

Pressing need for reform

The market-oriented camp of the Christian democrats is basing its argumentation on the
growing and already pressing need for welfare reform. They obtain their sense of urgency
from interpretations of current demographic and economic trends in Germany. The
demographic problems have been known for a while now. More extreme in Germany
than in almost any other country in the world, the effects of the contraction of the
population on the financing of the welfare systems are so strikingly clear that even the
German general public is well aware of them.73 Almost nobody still upholds the claim
that this sense of urgency is only a normative interpretation – some sociologists offering
the exception to the rule that is to be expected.74
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With only 1.2 newborns per woman, the German population is going through dramatic
changes. The demographic diagrams below indicate the transition between 1950 and
2050.

This demographic development has such dramatic effects on the finances of the welfare
state because it is coupled with three other developments: the lowering of the retirement
age increases the number of people living on pensions. The rising life expectancy has the
same effect. Longer lives also mean an increase in health care costs, exacerbated by the
increasing costs of modern drugs and operations. Youth also spends more years in
education today than during the time when the welfare systems were designed. The
combined result is, therefore, that the working population of Germany is becoming much
smaller in relation to the non-working population, as the following graph illustrates:
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As Streeck and Trampusch note, Germany’s rate of employment is remarkably low.75
Because the welfare benefits of the non-working adult population are paid for by the
working population, the demographical development of Germany poses an enormous
problem for the finances of the German welfare system. The Microzensus 2004, Europe’s
most extensive official household poll, shows the extent of these trends:76 in 2004, only
39% of all Germans relied on work as their main source of income. In 1991, the working
population had been 5% bigger. The most notable drop was recorded in the male
population: whereas 56% of males worked in 1991, the figure has dropped to a mere 47%
in 2004. Germany’s Federal Office of Statistics,77 who released the poll, confirmed that
the increase of both unemployment and the number of pensioners were the main drivers
behind this decrease of the working population. 19% of Germans lived on pensions in
1991. By 2004, this figure had reached 23% - almost a quarter of the entire population. It
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is not surprising, therefore, that the most frequent calls for welfare reform propose an
increase of the retirement age.

The second development that motivates reformers is the economic development of
Germany. Linked to the demographic factor because slow economic growth causes high
unemployment, which in turn represents a decrease of the working population and an
increase in total welfare costs, the economic factor is just as important as the
demographic one. Calls for reform therefore almost always reference these trends, as the
following example of Edmund Stoiber’s calls for reform illustrates: “Social expenditures
grew by an average 3.2 % between 1998 and 2002. The economy only grew by 2.3 % in
the same period. We simply cannot afford this any more.”78

2.

Paradigmatic Changes in Welfare Politics

If the pressing need for reform was the only factor, there would be little debate about
social policy reform amongst Christian democrats. The fact of the matter is, however, that
welfare retrenchment is a form of politics where the voter feedback is clear, rapid and
very one-dimensional: politicians who decrease the benefits of their citizens are swiftly
voted out of office. With the exception of tax cuts, there are few political decisions as
popular as the granting of new welfare benefits. Just as with tax increases, however, the
retrenchment of welfare benefits is almost universally despised among voters. One
scholar stands out as having analyzed the fundamental difference between the politics of
78
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welfare expansion and welfare retrenchment: Paul Pierson. His article The New Politics
of the Welfare State proves one premise: welfare reforms do not get elected; and comes to
a drastic conclusion: blame-avoidance is the name of the game in the age of welfare
retrenchment.

Pierson makes a claim for all mature welfare states: welfare retrenchment reforms are
usually a losing proposition.79 This claim holds to the fullest in the German case.80 The
examples are endless, but the most clear and recent example will suffice: the last election
of the Bundestag. Having built their campaign almost exclusively on the need for reform,
the Union did not manage to capitalize on the drastic disappointment amongst the
electorate about Schröder’s government. With only 35.2 %, the CDU/CSU had to form a
grand coalition with the social democrats. Most analysts try to explain this disappointing
election result by claiming that the voters dismissed the eager reformers and elected the
status quo.81

Politicians understand this dynamic all too well these days. Franz Müntefering, the SPD
vice-chancellor, famously refers to the electoral effect of welfare reforms by saying: ”that
doesn’t pay off…”.82 Horst Seehofer has stated repeatedly that entire elections can be lost
on health care and pension politics alone.83 When the Economic Council of the CDU84
published recommendations that called for radical reforms, Chancellor Merkel went out
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of her way to instantly underline that the Economic Council is not the CDU, but merely
an affiliated advisory board.85

The reason for this direct and drastic electoral feedback to welfare reforms cannot be
ascribed to the ignorance of the electorate. “The Germans know all too well that things
cannot go on like this,” states Spiegel magazine in 2005,86 and rightfully so. Polls from
late 2004 state that 87% of German voters think that more reforms are necessary. Only
3% believe that reforms have already gone too far.87 Similar results emerge from a
different poll in 2005. According to this study, 82% of Germany’s population believe that
Germany is in “strong” or “very strong” need of reforms.88 The benefits of welfare
retrenchment are clear to the voters. The costs, however, are even clearer, because they
hit voters directly. Another representative study offers a striking insight: it asked both for
voters’ awareness of the problems that the welfare state was facing, and at the same time
it asked about the respondents’ own willingness to contribute to the solutions. While 94%
of all respondents believed that the social insurance system faced “significant problems”
or was “about to collapse”, 50% of them stated that they would be unwilling to retire later,
80% thought it unnecessary to lower pension levels, and no less than 80% disagreed with
increasing the retirement age gradually to 67 years.89
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The polling data underlines what Pierson already stated on the theoretical level: the
electoral effect of welfare retrenchment is so negative because the benefits of
retrenchment are dispersed, while its costs are concentrated.90 It is thus not surprising that
reform is slow in a country where an enormous part of the population receives some sort
of welfare benefit.91

A great example of this dynamic is pension reform. The sum of uncovered future pension
benefits adds up to an astounding 1.5 trillion Euros at this point – two thirds of German
GDP.92 A more pressing call for reform is hardly imaginable. However, as has been noted
in the section on German demographics, the recipients of pension benefits make up
almost a quarter of Germany’s population. Furthermore, they are the Christian
democrats’ strongest electoral group: 60 % of pensioners vote CDU/CSU.93 Is it
surprising, therefore, that one side of the Christian democratic camp is resisting all kinds
of welfare reform while the other fraction is nearing frustration – lamenting about how
their children will ask them why they sat around when there was still time for change?94

As with his assumptions, Pierson’s conclusions apply fully to the German case: blame
avoidance is the name of the game.95 Extremely few reforms of welfare retrenchment are
popular amongst voters. No praise to be gained, the number and the extent of
retrenchment reforms is thus a function of the sense of urgency that the political camp
90
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perceives, relative to the probability with which it can orchestrate the reform without
being blamed excessively.

B. New pressures and new politics have triggered a period of ideological
re-alignment of Christian democracy in Germany

The independent variables that have caused the increase in social policy debate have thus
been identified: the demographic and economic pressures on one side, and the electoral
politics of welfare retrenchment on the other. Paul Pierson’s thesis – that the politics of
welfare expansion are very different from the politics of welfare retrenchment – is thus
supported by the German case.

The conclusions of the last chapters suggest that the current debate is not just an
intensification of a constant debate. Instead, the current debate seems to be as intense as it
is because the entire political paradigm that determines Christian democratic social policy
has changed. Indeed, it seems that the very concept of the soziale Marktwirtschaft –
Germany’s unique type of welfare state – is being called into question for the first time
since its conceptualization by the Christian democrats of the post-war period. Did the
new independent variables – the pressing need for reform and the problem of blameavoidance – really trigger a period of ideological re-alignment among the Christian
democrats of Germany? This chapter argues in favor of this claim.
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1.

“Soziale Marktwirtschaft”: the old contradiction96

Germany’s concept of the welfare state – the soziale Marktwirtschaft – is a concept of
inconsistency: it tries to unite Ludwig Erhard’s market economy with catholic social
doctrine. This combination, this trade-off, has been the definition of the term soziale
Marktwirtschaft since the Adenauer-CDU, and the social democrats approached it with
their program of Bad Godesberg in 1959.97 It is this inconsistency that is now facing
collapse. During the remainder of this essay, it will be argued that the debate about social
policy in the Christian democratic camp is so intense because the task is so daunting. The
protagonists of the reform-fraction perceive that simple reforms are not going to amend
the problems, but that a real paradigmatic re-conceptualization of Germany’s soziale
Marktwirtschaft is needed instead – a politically impossible task, of course.

The fact of the matter is that Germany’s soziale Marktwirtschaft has already evolved a lot
during the last 50 years. The original concept, developed by politicians such as Ludwig
Erhard, Franz Böhm, and Alfred Müller-Armack, has little to do with the problems of
modern social policy, such as old-age care insurance and non-wage labor costs. The
96
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concept was born in order to establish market economy as the new economic framework
after war and totalitarianism. Not only did Britain’s new Labour government exert much
influence onto its sector of Germany in order to establish a planned economy, the array of
social views united in the early CDU and CSU included blatantly socialist thought as well.
Chancellor Adenauer’s staunch insistence on market economy suppressed these
tendencies. The real push that established market economy as Germany’s economic order,
however, was the force of chancellor-to-be Ludwig Erhard. His political engagement, and
Adenauer’s support of him98, put an end to socialist tendencies in German Christian
democratic thought. As the Neue Züricher Zeitung commented in an article on Erhard’s
60th birthday in 1957: „Erhard’s greatest feat lies in the fact that, in times when even
liberals started to doubt liberalism, he gave the irrevocable proof that the market
economy releases energies that a command economy cannot mobilize even through the
most draconic means.”99

The original conceptualization of the soziale Marktwirtschaft was not a combination of
two opposed values, but a system of intricate design: the concept was to “have the social
appear in the market and through the market”. This concept is very theoretical and
difficult indeed, and that is part of the reason why it was transformed so much by the
workings of practical politics. It was Chancellor Adenauer who changed the system from
its unified theoretical conceptualization into a practical combination of two seemingly
contradictory values: free market forces and catholic social doctrine. With this
transformation, Adenauer robbed the soziale Marktwirtschaft of its monolithic
98
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conceptualization, but the success of this model of contradiction probably lies in the
practical nature that Adenauer forged, not in the theoretical original concept. Nonetheless,
the conflict between the socially-oriented and the market-oriented components of the
soziale Marktwirtschaft are now re-appearing as Germany’s deepest structural problem,
causing the debate on social policy amongst Germany’s Christian democrats to reach
unheard-of levels of intensity.

2.

The Conservative Dilemma

The combination of market-economy and social policy embedded in Adenauer’s notion
of the German welfare state is just as much a defining characteristic of the Christian
democratic electorate. The CDU and the CSU include what can be called a conservative
and a neo-liberal fraction. Under the new dynamics of the age of welfare retrenchment,
these two fractions clash like never before. Cordt Schnibben, one of Germany’s leading
journalists, describes this clash as follows: “the conservative Christian democrats want
security, stability and risk-minimization, while the neo-liberals call for radical reforms,
more private initiative, more risk, less state and more market.” “The Christian democratic
camp is disintegrating into reform-citizens and status-quo-citizens.”100

This almost schizophrenic division of Christian democracy in the age of retrenchment is
most clearly illustrated by the award for the “Reformer of the Year”. Issued by the
reform-promoting initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft and the conservative
100
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newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, the last three awards were given to
Paul Kirchhof, Friedrich Merz and Udo DiFabio101 - the first a professor who advocates a
radical flat tax system, the second the leader of the neo-liberal fraction of the CDU, and
the third a judge on the constitutional court and father of many who had just published a
book in which he called for the return to values associated with the Wirtschaftswunder of
the 1950s – a conservative pleading for the values of family, nation, and religion as
essential features of life in a liberal society. The conservative dilemma between
liberalism and conservativism could not be made clearer then by the choice of these three
reformers.

The more pressure the new politics of welfare retrenchment exert on the situation in
Germany, the more divided these two fractions of Christian democracy become, leading
into a possible identity crisis of serious ramifications. The past election of the Bundestag
already indicates this direction: caught up in an internal debate as to what reforms to
undertake and when and how to communicate them to the electorate, the Christian
democrats confused both fractions of their electorate. The discussion about Professor
Kirchhof’s flat tax scared those leaning to the conservative side, and the return of such
symbols of status quo as Horst Seehofer disappointed the neo-liberal fraction.102 The
Christian democrats are realizing that the ideological re-alignment must occur soon, come
what may. Time is working against the CDU/CSU. The Volk is getting more and more
confused about its Volkspartei.
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C. The general debate expresses itself in disputes between CDU and CSU

The chapters above provide evidence for the first part of the thesis presented in this essay:
that the disagreement on social policy amongst Christian democrats is not carried out
along the party divide between CDU and CSU, but between two fractions in both parties.
It remains to be explained, however, why this general debate is nonetheless commonly
perceived as a dispute between CDU and CSU. Thus, the question guiding this chapter is:
why does the general debate in the Christian democratic camp occasionally express itself
as a dispute between the two Christian democratic parties?

Let us assume a hypothetical original position as a starting point before a dispute between
CDU and CSU. At this starting point, the CDU and the CSU are composed of politicians
with the same ideological composition, acting under the same external influences by
electorate and interest groups. Even if this starting point was realistic, it would not be
likely that the CDU and the CSU end up with a unified social policy. The institutional
and political framework that the two parties operate in favors a natural gravitation away
from each other on the scale between status quo and radical reform. This is mainly due to
two factors.

Firstly, the CSU has an interest to take a different political stance than the CDU for the
sake of guaranteeing its independence and leverage on national debates. The CSU has
played a political role on both the local and the national level ever since Franz-Josef
Strauß developed ambitions in national politics. Stoiber continues this tradition. “I
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represent a party without which the Union could not win nationwide elections”, he states,
and rightfully so. The number of votes that the CSU contributes to the nationwide Union
usually amounts to anything between 16% and 23%. The higher the ratio of CSU votes to
the total, the more ministries the CSU obtains in a government coalition and the stronger
its influence on national affairs. While the CDU and the CSU do not run against each
other during Bundestag election campaigns, the ambition of the CSU to score as high as
possible in comparison to the CDU is undeniable. There are many examples of situations
where it happened to be opportune for a CSU politician to make a statement that would
benefit the election result of the CSU in Bavaria while clearly damaging the result of the
CDU in the rest of Germany. Some even claim that the disappointing result of the
Bundestag elections of 2005 had a great deal to do with Stoiber’s remarks about “the East
deciding who will be chancellor this time again” – remarks that were interpreted as direct
attacks and stereotyping against the people of the new Länder.103 Stoiber’s speech was
very popular in the south, but caused substantial uproar against the CDU/CSU in the rest
of Germany, doing great damage to the campaign.

The natural tendency for the CSU as a whole to deviate from the political stances of the
CDU is only exacerbated by the second factor: the contest for the common candidate for
chancellorship. The leaders of CDU and CSU are usually the contestants over the
candidacy, and in the years running up to the decision, the two are always in denial over
the fact that their respective policy positions will prove decisive over who will get the
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desired post.104 Many a populist statement and other disputes between CDU and CSU can
be explained by the factor of candidacy.

This natural tendency for the CSU and its leader to differentiate themselves from CDU
policy thus explains why we see differences between the CDU and the CSU that cannot
really be explained by anything else other than election campaigns. From this perspective,
it is only logical that the CSU should substantially deviate from CDU policy in a time
like the current age of welfare retrenchment, where social policy produces a strongly
negative electoral effect.

Indeed, the dispute over the Herzog-Papers between CDU and CSU is best explained
following Pierson’s paradigm of electoral politics in the age of welfare retrenchment. The
CSU seems to have realized the realities of retrenchment reform politics much earlier
than the CDU did. When Horst Seehofer dropped out of the Herzog Commission in 2003,
it seems very plausible that Stoiber and Seehofer decided to resist the reforms that the
CDU was obviously going to propose out of fear of an electoral slash-back. If there was
no direct agreement on this strategy, then it seems likely that the leaders of the CSU at
least tacitly agreed that the CDU’s direction of reform and communication strategy were
not going to be popular. When Merkel and Merz issued the results of the Herzog
Commission, Stoiber and other CSU politicians instantly offered criticisms based on the
question of social justice. Even the catholic newspaper Die Tagespost did not buy into the
sincerity with which Stoiber was making these social criticisms: “Stoiber is quite pleased
that Merkel is going in an almost neo-liberal direction. It makes it much easier for him to
104

Christof Schult und Ralf Neukirch, Gefahr duch den Sieg. Der Spiegel 17/2005, April 25th 2004

51

sell the CSU as the more social CDU in the future, and to present himself as the savior of
Germany, who, while willing to engage in reforms of the economic and the social sphere,
will keep a close eye on the issue of social balance.”105

The extent to which the strategies of CDU and CSU differed during the period between
2003 and the past election in 2005 suggests an almost unique period of re-calibration of
Christian democratic social policy in the age of retrenchment. The CDU under Merkel
and Merz believed that radical reform was absolutely necessary, and that the CDU was
conservative enough already. As long as the need for radical reforms was communicated
correctly, the reform strategy would not be despised too much by the electorate.106 The
CSU under Stoiber and Seehofer took the exact opposite stance. Stoiber himself had
outgunned his own calls for radical reforms time and time again just some months before
the Herzog-Commission. All of a sudden, however, he stressed nothing more than the
responsibility of the CSU to guarantee that reforms remained socially just. Stoiber began
to follow a strategy that followed the paradigm: the more radical the reforms we
propagate, the less votes we get. The result was a re-invigoration of the catch-all politics
with which the CSU has obtained its almost hegemonic grip over the political landscape
of Bavaria.

It is not surprising that it was the CSU who took the position of the more social Christian
democratic party during this period of dispute. For many decades now, the CSU has
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brought to perfection what Kees van Kersbergen identified as the most defining feature of
Christian democratic parties: the emphasis on compromise and catch-all strategy.107
David Broughton emphasizes this point by claiming that the CDU and the CSU are
driven by pragmatism rather than principle,108 and that the Christian democrats are parties
that exist to keep themselves in power rather than to achieve a certain kind of ideology.109
Whatever the validity of this rather provocative claim, he is right to point out that the
very first sentence of the party programs of CDU and CSU state that they are
Volksparteien, people’s parties.110 The CSU still obtains over 60% of all the votes in
Bavaria, having governed the Land ever since World War II. The social democrats in
Bavaria are reduced to astounding marginality. Without a doubt, the concept of the
Volkspartei has never been perfected to the extent of the CSU.

The insistence on catch-all strategy in the CSU is not a matter of choice, however.
Generous social policy helped the CSU gain the almost hegemonic electoral grip over
Bavaria that it guards till this day. Their policy track record is binding now. The CSU
knows they can only keep such tight control of the Bavarian electorate if they do not give
the Social democrats any leeway in social matters. On issues of economics and ethics, the
conservative Bavarian electorate will remain faithful to the CSU, which is not the case
for the CDU in all of Germany. In Bavaria, however, the welfare state is the only chance
that the Bavarian SPD has left. The CSU is acutely aware of this, and will thus be very
careful during the age of welfare retrenchment.
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III. CONCLUSIONS
A. Christian democratic social policy in the age of retrenchment

In the age of retrenchment, the strain between the market-oriented and socially-oriented
values that is inherently built into Adenauer’s concept of the soziale Marktwirtschaft is
re-appearing as Germany’s most difficult structural problem, as has been pointed out. The
new politics of welfare retrenchment delineated by Paul Pierson hold explanatory power
in this situation, by predicting correctly that Merkel’s and Merz’s attempt to
communicate radical reforms and get them past the electorate was doomed to fail. The
conservative dilemma will in all likelihood be won by the conservative fraction in the
Christian democratic parties. The neo-liberal wing is too small, and all interest group
pressure from employers, industry and others111 cannot outweigh the electorate pressures
that punish most welfare reformers.

Electoral politics thus decided the direction that Christian democratic social policy is
taking in the age of retrenchment. The reform-fraction of the CDU has realized this now
as well. Ever since the disappointing results of the Bundestag election of 2005, Angela
Merkel has toned down her reform rhetoric by a considerable amount. Colleagues and
electorate are thanking her for it – relations are good in the CDU these days, and
Chancellor Merkel’s approval ratings are consistently high.112 The conclusion that
compromise wins, even when the result is grey middle ground, has sunken in with the
111
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Christian democrats. Focus on catch-all strategy has returned and the term Volkspartei
appears much more often. The conclusion is simple, and yet it took dramatic years to be
understood: “After all we are a Volkspartei. The people demand of us that we stand for
socially just politics.”113 The fact that both the acronyms CDU and CSU end with Union
is not an accident. Catch-all politics is only the modern term for the oldest of all
ambitions of the Union parties: “to replace the old party type of the 19th century with a
political union; a permanently established, lasting community of action, formed by
Catholics and Protestants, by workers and entrepreneurs, by farmers and craftsmen, by
the self-employed and civil servants, from both city and country side.”114

B. The future of the German welfare state in the age of retrenchment

While the scope of this essay only included Christian democracy, it allows some spin-off
conclusions about the future of the German welfare state in the age of retrenchment.

1.

Supremacy of Electoral Politics

Merkel and Merz had to learn it the hard way: honesty does not get elected. Basing their
candid descriptions of future reforms on their trust that the people will honor truthfulness
and honesty, Merkel and Merz campaigned by laying out the dramatic situation in
Germany and by announcing radical remedies. The electorate got scared more than it was
113
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re-assured, and the social democrats managed to rebound off of this confusion. It is to be
suspected, therefore, that the election campaigns of 2002 and 2005 were the last ones to
be based on a hard-core call for reforms. Welfare reform will be campaigned for in a
more retrenched way in the future, with much less transparency about the exact nature of
reforms that each party is planning to carry out.

A second truth about electoral politics in the age of retrenchment is linked to the issue of
truth in campaigns: election promises matter. A wonderful adage in German describes
this fact: “Wahltag ist Zahltag”, meaning “election day is pay-day”. This is no news to
German social politics: after all, the CDU only succeeded once in winning an absolute
majority of the Bundestag in all of its 60 years of history: in 1957, right after Adenauer
had announced the introduction of Germany’s generous pension system. Ludwig Erhard
and other finance experts had warned incessantly about the inherently dangerous design
of the system, should economic development and the fertility rate stall. Adenauer was
well aware of the electoral potential of this reform, however, and he proceeded.115

Let us focus for a moment on the most socially-oriented statements by Christian
democrats in recent months. CDU chairman of Rhineland-Palatinate Christoph Böhr
stated in the Berliner Zeitung that the CDU is not the megaphone of the employers and of
the industrial association. The unemployed should be at the center of Christian
democratic social policy. While more welfare benefits cannot be expected, that should
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not mean that benefit cuts are necessary. His colleague from Baden-Württemberg, CDU
fraction leader Stefan Mappus, sounds similar: the Union has to show clearly that it is
dedicated to socially balanced politics. The CDU has to make sure it does not come
across as granting demands to businesses and the wealthy only, while demanding more
contributions from the employed. Jürgen Scharf, CDU fraction leader in Saxony-Anhalt,
demanded that the CDU and the CSU do not neglect the social components of Christian
democratic politics. The social nature of the market economy was at stake.

The interesting common denominator between these three speakers is that, a couple of
weeks after their respective statements, there were elections in all of their three Länder.
On the 26th of March 2006, all three of them were eagerly waiting to see by how much
their rhetoric had helped the results of the CDU.116 Indeed, Wahltag ist Zahltag, and the
Christian democrats have never been more generous.

2.

Towards the Middle Path

The second group of conclusions about the future of Germany’s welfare state focuses on
the programmatic equilibrium between Christian democrats and social democrats that is
likely to be struck in future debates. Not only is a policy convergence visible amongst the
Christian democrats after the disappointing results of the elections of the Bundestag in
2005. Policy convergence in the social realm seems to be a national phenomenon. Even
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the boundaries of social policy between the SPD and the Union have been successfully
argued to be no more than marginal these days.117

As has been noted above, Christian democrats will not publicly push for radical welfare
reforms any more, having learned their lesson in 2002 and 2005. The reform-wing of the
CDU/CSU has given up on the hope to collect a majority for radical reform. The result of
this is that the “fight for the middle” has become a “race to the left.”118 Merkel and
Müntefering are currently trying to find out who can appear more socially-oriented.119
Professor Franz Walter describes the policy convergence between all parties as follows:

“The majority of the republic is, in short, a little bit social-democratic, a
little bit neo-liberal, a little bit Christian, and a little bit green. […] And
so the parties are becoming the same patchwork as society as a whole.
The more fragmented society, the more contradictory the programmatic
pool of the parties.”120

Horst Seehofer is happy these days. After arduous years of fighting a united front of
Christian democratic reformers almost by himself to defend a social dimension of
Christian democracy that seemed like it would disappear forever, Seehofer can now lean
back and enjoy the spectacle of the Union’s return to social values.121
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Indeed, Seehofer’s long-time credo seems to have been adopted by the whole of Christian
democracy: “Moderation and the middle way”122 – that’s what he calls his program.
When he feels lyrical, he terms it “You walk safest in the middle.”123 Will the reformers
remain quiet, though? Jürgen Kluge, Director of McKinsey Germany, who has positioned
his firm and name in countless commissions, interviews and events about reform in
Germany, already warns in rhyme: “In Gefahr und höchster Not bringt der Mittelweg den
Tod.”124 – “At times of great perils and danger, the path through the middle leads to
death.” Maybe the middle way is exactly what Germany’s welfare systems need right
now, though. The middle way, the great compromise, the grand coalition, might just be
the only possibility for any reform to take place in the setting of retrenchment politics.

3.

The grand coalition – unique opportunity for reform?

During the last few years, when the German welfare state was incessantly criticized in
harsh terms, some voices were even arguing that the entire concept soziale
Marktwirtschaft had to be given up. This will not happen. If the few years of welfare
retrenchment politics that Germany has experienced so far have taught us anything, it is
that the population of a mature welfare state will not be lured into radical reforms simply
be the communication of a strong sense of urgency. The German welfare state will
survive. No exit strategy would ever get elected.
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Indeed, recent data on public opinion about issues of welfare and income redistribution
indicates a renewed trust in the state.125 The constant call for reforms has caused unrest,
but the people’s reaction was not – as might have been expected – to retreat into the
private domain. Instead, a majority of Germans would be willing to pay higher taxes if
the role of the state would be strengthened and social differences in society were flattened.
76% of respondents called for more income redistribution, while only 56% had held the
same opinion a year before. There seems to be a solid consensus in the German
population: a confirmation of trust in the welfare state and the concept of soziale
Marktwirtschaft. This homogenous public support for the welfare state has always been a
presumption about the Germans,126 and it seems to hold true even in the age of welfare
retrenchment.

The current grand coalition government between the Union and the SPD can count on
this public support for the welfare state. Taking into consideration the electoral politics in
the age of retrenchment, where the party arguing for the least amount of reform is
advantaged in electoral terms, the grand coalition could actually represent a unique
opportunity for reforming the German welfare state. When one Volkspartei is in
opposition, the governing party can never pursue reforms: it would instantly get shoved
out of the door like Schröder was. Pierson and others stress the fact that any retrenchment
reform needs to be based on a strong coalition between many of the important actors
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involved in social policy making.127 The constellation of the two major parties being tied
up in governmental responsibility together thus presents the opportunity to sort out the
differences and embark on a common set of reforms before even fronting with public
opinion. In this manner, the blame for reforms could be shared. The deadlock caused by
the constant competition about which party is more social could be overcome.

This very week, the CDU and the SPD have each initiated a set of closed sessions to
ponder over and re-define current programmatic stances on social policy.128 It remains to
be seen whether these programmatic sessions result in the Union and the SPD taking up
deadlock positions across a dogmatic divide, or if they manage to find common ground
for reforms that could be carried out in their common legislative period.

However, even if the current programmatic sessions yielded common ground, what kind
of commitment can the two Volksparteien expect from each other? In the current setting
where any party benefits by deviating from a common course of reform and falling back
into social rhetoric, both actors are facing a classic prisoner’s dilemma. Is the high level
of collaboration between CDU, CSU and SPD that would be needed for a common
course of reform even remotely realistic? Classic game theory as well as a healthy
intuition of electoral politics in the age of welfare retrenchment suggests that one party
will defect sooner or later. The chance of a stable equilibrium of collaboration seems slim
– in all likelihood, the German welfare state will have to exist in the contradictory form
of Adenauer’s sozialer Marktwirtschaft for quite a while longer.
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APPENDIX
The German population is shrinking
“You wanna kebob spicy or no spicy?”
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Will the German mission to Congo be a success?
“Let’s take the child soldiers home – we need more kids to pay our pensions.”
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